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ABSTRACT
Objectives: To identify the authentication and detection
rate of serialised medicines using medicines
authentication technology.
Design and intervention: 4192 serialised medicines
were entered into a hospital dispensary over two separate
8-week stages in 2015. Medicines were authenticated
using secure external database cross-checking, triggered
by the scanning of a two-dimensional data matrix with a
unit specific 12-digit serial code. 4% of medicines
included were preprogrammed with a message to identify
the product as either expired, pack recalled, product
recalled or counterfeit.
Setting: A site within a large UK National Health Service
teaching hospital trust.
Participants: Accredited checking staff, pharmacists
and dispensers in a pharmacy department.
Primary outcome measures: Authentication and
detection rate of counterfeit expired and recalled
medicines.
Results: The operational detection rate of counterfeit,
recalled and expired medicines scanned as a combined
group was 81.4% (stage 1 (S1)) and 87% (stage 2 (S2)).
The technology’s technical detection rate (TDR) was
100%; however, not all medicines were scanned and of
those that were scanned not all that generated a warning
message were quarantined. Owing to an operational
authentication rate (OAR) of 66.3% (over both stages),
only 31.8% of counterfeit medicines, 58% of recalled
drugs and 64% of expired medicines were detected as a
proportion of those entered into the study. Response
times (RTs) of 152 ms (S1) and 165 ms (S2) were
recorded, meeting the falsified medicines directive-
mandated 300 ms limit.
Conclusions: TDRs and RTs were not a limiting factor
in this study. The suboptimal OAR poses significant
quality and safety issues with this detection approach.
Authentication at the checking stage, however,
demonstrated higher OARs. There is a need for further
qualitative research to establish the reasons for less than
absolute authentication and detection rates in the hospital
environment to improve this technology in preparation
for the incumbent European Union regulative deadline.
INTRODUCTION
The terms counterfeit and falsiﬁed are often
used interchangeably. According to the Food
and Drug Administration (FDA), a counter-
feit medicine is fake medicine. It may be
contaminated or contain the wrong or no
active ingredient. They could have the right
active ingredient but at the wrong dose.1
According to the European Medicines
Agency, falsiﬁed medicines are fake medi-
cines that pass themselves off as real,
authorised medicines.2 The pharmaceutical
security institute report that between 2011
and 2015 the global incidence of drug coun-
terfeiting has increased by 51%, with 2015
seeing the highest levels of counterfeiting to
date, a 38% increase when compared with
2014.3 This upward trend can also be seen in
Strengths and limitations of this study
▪ This is the first study to academically assess the
effectiveness of medicines authentication technol-
ogy in the secondary care setting, demonstrating
the current strengths and weaknesses of this
technology, technical and operational, for consid-
eration by healthcare providers and policymakers.
▪ This study is based on the introduction of 4192
two-dimensional (2D) data matrices into a live
hospital dispensary.
▪ Owing to the lack of widespread serialisation,
this study required the manual adherence of 2D
labels to each product, which made it possible
to assess only one National Health Service
(NHS) teaching hospital at the outset.
▪ This pilot introduced 2D data matrices into an
NHS hospital, which were preprogrammed with
falsified or substandard medicine alerts. This
study did not introduce any falsified or substand-
ard medicine alerts into the supply chain, as to
do so would be unethical.
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the UK supply chain, where 11 cases of falsiﬁed medi-
cines were detected over an 11-year period (2001–2011)4
The direct result of medicine counterfeiting includes
deterioration of medicine quality and therefore patient
health, unnecessary drug side effects and death in some
of the most vulnerable patient groups.5–12 The indirect
effects of drug counterfeiting include a loss in govern-
ment tax revenue and the funding of illegal activity
which may include terrorist organisations.13 High proﬁle
cases of counterfeit medicines include anticancer agents
such as Avastin (Bevacizumab; USA),6 Herceptin
(Trastuzumab; UK, Finland and Germany)8 and epi-
demic cases such as those seen in Bangladesh, where
unsafe levels of ethylene glycol found in paracetamol
elixir, which were responsible for the renal failure and
death of over 50 patients (mostly children),10 and repre-
sents an international medicines safety issue.
The current methods for detecting counterfeit medi-
cine are varied in nature and span from laboratory-based
methods through to SMS texting. The detection of coun-
terfeit medicines by customs ofﬁcials usually occurs as a
result of intelligence or random checks, suspect medicines
are then sent away for laboratory-based analysis. Advancing
technology has made a variety of techniques available
which include spectroscopy, chromatography, SMS, hand-
held or portable laboratories, radiofrequency identiﬁca-
tion and serialisation.14 Serialisation is the process of
identifying a medicine with a unique code printed onto
the medicines pack and veriﬁcation is the process for iden-
tifying and checking that code. In terms of the falsiﬁed
medicines directive (FMD), the term ‘authentication’
relates to the ﬁnal scanning of a medicine and the subse-
quent decommissioning of a product at the point of
supply to the patient to ensure authenticity. The 2011
FMD15–18 and the 2013 Drug Quality and Security Act
(DQSA)19 have adopted the serialisation and veriﬁcation
approach for counterfeit medicine detection. This is a
low-cost, non-destructive and quick method for detecting
counterfeit medicines. The FMD requires the systematic
authentication of medicines at the point of supply to the
patient while the DQSA requires veriﬁcation at every point
of sale and exchange throughout the drug distribution
cycle, currently without authentication at the point of sale
or administration to the patient. Although practices
similar to those proposed by the FMD exist within the
Italian, Greek and Belgian primary care markets, princi-
pally as a reimbursement method, FMD-legislated serialisa-
tion and authentication technologies are alien to many
countries and have not been academically assessed and
may prove difﬁcult to implement, especially in the hetero-
geneous secondary care environment.20
OBJECTIVES
Primary objectives
Primary objectives were to identify the:
1. Operational authentication rate (OAR): The percentage
of medicines scanned as a proportion of those
entered into the study.
2. Technical detection rate (TDR): The ability of the authen-
tication technology to read the two-dimensional (2D)
data matrix of a counterfeit drug and generate a
message to identify it as such.
3. Operational detection rate (ODR): The number of medi-
cines quarantined as a percentage of those identiﬁed
as recalled, expired or potentially counterfeit by the
technology.
Secondary objectives
Secondary objectives were to identify the:
1. Optimum point in the dispensing process to authen-
ticate medicines based on OAR and ODR.
2. Response time (RT) of the technology: The time it takes to
scan a medicine, send the information to an external
database for cross-checking and return an accurate
result.
METHODS
Study site
The district general hospital involved in this study is one
of four hospitals in a large UK National Health Service
(NHS) foundation trust. This site was selected due to
the presence of specialist and general medical and surgi-
cal services provided. The variety of clinical services
available ensured a diversity of medical treatments in
hospital circulation and provided a balanced portfolio of
medicines available for serialisation during this study.
Sample selection
Medicines were selected using a set of inclusion and exclu-
sion criteria (ﬁgure 1). These criteria ensured that the
medicines selected for inclusion reﬂected the categories
of medicines governed by the FMD and the most com-
monly counterfeited drug groups, which included the top
50 medicines by turnover and the top 50 medicines by
cost. Medicines not covered by FMD legislation were then
excluded. This process returned a list of 87 products. The
top 15 by usage and top 15 by value were then included in
the study; a reduced number of study products was imple-
mented for practical administrative reasons.
The approach taken to identify a study drug sample
resulted in a diversity of medicines representing major
clinical indications and formulations (see online
supplementary appendix 1). This ensured that a variety
of products of differing clinical indication, formulation
and cost were included in this study to represent the
variety of medicines used in the secondary care environ-
ment and to avoid the inclusion of medicines which are
not governed by FMD legislation. An exception was
made for a number of high-volume pharmacy supervised
sale (P) and general sales list (GSL) medicines in an
effort to maintain high dispensing throughput.
Materials
Unique global standards one (GS1) 2D data matrix
labels were produced and cut to size to limit the
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product area obscured by the label. Corresponding 2D
data matrix codes were loaded and stored in an excel
spreadsheet. The authentication technology had previ-
ously been integrated into the hospital patient medica-
tion record (PMR). The aforementioned software was
operated by an existing computer terminal. The medi-
cine codes were presented as a 2D data matrix and
scanned using a handheld, terminal powered, barcode
scanner, which identiﬁed the product as either
‘Authenticated elsewhere’ (counterfeit), ‘Item Expired’,
‘Item Recalled (product or batch)’, ‘Authenticated’ or
‘Already Authenticated here’ (ﬁgures 2 and 3).
Labelling procedure
Each 2D barcode was detailed in an excel database.
Drug details such as product name, form, strength, pack
size and the date on which the product was labelled
were recorded in the database when the adhesive code
was adhered to each study product, providing a com-
plete record of study medicines serialised and the date
of inclusion into the study. The 2D data matrix was
attached to each study product according to a hierarchy
described in the study protocol to ensure that the
obscuring of important clinical data such as product
name, strength, form, batch number or expiry date were
not excessive during the study period.
2D data matrices were attached to all study medicines
each Monday and Wednesday between the hours of 7:00
and 14:00 weekly, which maintained the serialisation of
product lines throughout the study. Ninety-six per cent
of medicines labelled, once authenticated by the
operator, would provide a symbol to indicate the
product as safe for use and ‘Authenticated’. If a product
authenticated within the organisation were to be
reauthenticated, the system would display an ‘Already
Authenticated here’ message (ﬁgure 2). This was useful
when dealing with multiple authentications of split pack
medicines. ‘Authenticated’ and ‘Already Authenticated
here’ messaging did not require quarantine (ﬁgure 2).
A 1% subgroup of medicines were labelled with a 2D
data matrix which prompted a response of
‘Authenticated elsewhere’ (ﬁgure 3) indicating that this
drug may have been counterfeited or falsiﬁed (copied)
and introduced or reintroduced into the legal supply
chain. A further three subgroups were introduced into
the study, classiﬁed as recalled pack, recalled product
and expired product at a frequency of 1% per subgroup
(ﬁgure 3). All study products which were labelled with a
2D data matrix generating a warning pop-up message
had the expiry and batch number recorded in the excel
database upon inclusion in the study to facilitate
follow-up, should any of the study products require sub-
sequent investigation. The 1% ﬁgure was based on
WHO estimate that ∼1% of the world’s medicines are
counterfeit.21 To ensure equity amongst subgroups, the
expired medicines and recalled medicines groups were
also allocated a 1% distribution.
Study design
A 2-week pilot stage was conducted initially to ensure
the technology and proposed study process were prac-
tical and without external database communication
Figure 1 Inclusion and
exclusion criteria for study
medications.
Figure 2 Pop-up messages triggered on authentication of medicines that are safe for administration.
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issues. The study was then separated into two stages.
Stage 1 (S1) involved the authentication of medicines at
the checking stage (by pharmacists and accredited
checking technicians) and stage 2 (S2) at the dispensing
stage (by dispensers and some accuracy checking
technicians).
All staff were subjected to the same basic training
(presentation and demonstration) and were instructed
to authenticate according to the authentication proto-
col. Operators authenticated medicines at the point of
supply to the patient or ward for named patients. Ward
stock authentication was not included in this study.
Data cleansing and analysis was conducted for authen-
tication and detection data using a cleansing and ana-
lysis form. This form was independently veriﬁed by a
separate researcher to conﬁrm results.
Statistical analysis
Drug sample size studies were conducted to ensure the
total sample of study drugs was large enough to obtain
reasonable CIs and margins of error using two inde-
pendent sample size calculators.22 23 The total popula-
tion was based on 2015 average 8-week dispensing ﬁgure
of 9605 products and the sample sizes were 2115 (S1)
and 2077 (S2). Z-tests by proportion for independent
groups24 were employed to identify if there was statistic-
ally signiﬁcant differences between results in S1 and S2.
Percentages were employed to demonstrate differences
between groups, which accounted for the slightly differ-
ent numbers of study drugs in each stage.
Operator groups
S1 contained a selection of pharmacists and accredited
checking technicians. S2 contained a selection of dis-
pensers and accredited technicians. Dispensers could
not be involved in S1 by law and pharmacists would not
routinely be involved in S2 due to departmental policy;
dispensing is not a role conducted by pharmacists
during normal working hours. Accuracy checking tech-
nicians are largely responsible for involvement in S1 and
there are likely to be instances where they would also be
involved in S2. Staff are not, however, permitted to be
involved in both stages for the same prescription accord-
ing to hospital policy.
Blinding and disclaimers
Operators
Although the 2D labels contained some adjacent print,
which if analysed carefully over numerous scans could
reveal a trend between expired and recalled medicine
labels, to do so would be very time-consuming, unlikely
to have occurred and was not mentioned in operator
feedback. The operators were blinded as to which drugs
were ‘suspicious/counterfeit’, expired or recalled.
Figure 3 Pop-up messages triggered on authentication of medicines requiring quarantine.
4 Naughton B, et al. BMJ Open 2016;6:e013837. doi:10.1136/bmjopen-2016-013837
Open Access
Researcher
Researcher was not blinded at the point of labelling.
As authentication was performed towards the later
stages of prescription preparation process, authentication
had no part to play in stock control during this study.
The study did not relate to or use any patient data.
Patient involvement
Patients, carers or lay persons did not participate in this
research. The design of this study, the research questions
and the outcome measures were informed by clinical,
technical, research and industry leaders and did not
include patient involvement. Clinical, technical, research
and industry leaders were involved in the recruitment to
and conduct of this study. Results will be disseminated to
study participants initially via internal presentation and
via access to the research manuscript once available.
Participants have been acknowledged in this publication.
RESULTS
A total of 4192 drugs were entered into this study
(2115=S1; 2077=S2), 180 of which contained a prepro-
grammed message pop-up which described the product
as counterfeit, expired or recalled and requiring quaran-
tine (92=S1, 88=S2) (ﬁgure 4). The S1 group authenti-
cated 1447 medicines of which 59 required quarantine.
The S2 group authenticated 1344 medicines, of which
54 required quarantine. Not all medicines that were
identiﬁed as requiring quarantine were quarantined.
Only 48 of the 59 medicines in S1 and 47 of the 54 med-
icines in S2 were quarantined (ODR).
The OAR relates to the number of medicines authen-
ticated in a particular stage as a percentage of the total
number of medicines entered into said stage. For this
study, the OAR was 66.3% overall; 68.4% (95% CI) S1
and 64.7% (95% CI) S2.
The TDR relates to the ability of the technology alone
to detect counterfeit, expired or recalled medicines,
that is, read the 2D data matrix of a counterfeit drug
and generate a message to identify it as such, and to
store the relevant information. Multisite testing in this
study has generated a 100% TDR. ODR demonstrates
the relationship between scanned medicines identiﬁed
as counterfeit, recalled or expired by the technology
and those correctly quarantined by the staff. The ODR
across scanned medicines was 84% across all groups;
81.4% S1 and 87% S2; a 5.6% difference between the
groups. The group with the lowest ODR was the
‘Authenticated elsewhere (counterfeit)’ group which
demonstrated a rate of 58.3%.
There were ﬁve groups of drugs, with ﬁve correspond-
ing pop-up messages entered into this study, counterfeit
drugs (authenticated elsewhere), recalled products
(product recalled), recalled batch (batch recalled),
expired medicines (item expired) and safe-to-use medi-
cines (authenticated). Across both stages, 31.8% of
counterfeit medicines, 58% of recalled drugs (product
and batch) and 64% of expired medicines were detected
as a percentage of those entered into the study.
Z-tests by proportion for independent groups identi-
ﬁed if the differences between ODR in each subgroup
were of statistical signiﬁcance (Yes/No outcomes were
generated using table 1 data). The only statistical differ-
ence lied between the counterfeit group and all other
subgroups, individually and as an entire group.22
The difference between alerts used for potentially
counterfeit drugs (authenticated elsewhere) and the
alert for medicines which have already been authenti-
cated on site appears similar in this study (ﬁgure 7).
Figure 4 Data tree which
identified the total number of
medicines serialised for each
stage of the study (medicines
included), medicines detected by
the authentication technology,
stored on the secure database
(database detected) and finally,
the total number of medicines in
each stage quarantined for
researcher investigation (operator
detection (quarantine)).
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The medicines authentication technology RT is the
total time taken for the information scanned from the
2D data matrix to make a round trip from the scanning
terminal to the authentication database and back. The
mean RT over each 8-week period was 152 ms in S1 and
165 ms in S2 (ﬁgure 5). The FMD-mandated response
rate (RR) is <300 ms.15
DISCUSSION
Medicines were entered into an active secondary care dis-
pensary system. The data generated (ﬁgures 4 and 6)
identiﬁed a gap between serialised medicines entered
into the study and those authenticated by the operators,
the OAR. There also appears to be a disparity between
medicines identiﬁed by the technology and those sepa-
rated for quarantine (ODR) (ﬁgure 4). The OAR which
represents user compliance across both stages was 66.3%.
When compared with the expected standard of 100%,
this ﬁgure appears to be relatively low which may be due
to operator compliance issues. The OAR demonstrated a
statistically signiﬁcant difference of 3.7% (Z-test) (95%
CI)24 between S1 and S2, which consisted of two largely
different operator groups. A 3.7% difference in authenti-
cation rates could lend itself to the argument that the
pharmacists and accuracy checking technicians at the
checking stage are better suited in terms of manual
Table 1 Breakdown of data from figure 4 by stage and authentication technology alerts category to demonstrate detection at
each step of the study
Authentication technology alert categories
Stages Authenticated elsewhere (counterfeit) Product recalled Batch recalled Item expired
No. of medicines included
Stage 1 22 24 24 22
Stage 2 22 22 22 22
Operator authenticated
Stage 1 13 12 18 16
Stage 2 11 17 12 14
Operator-detected (quarantine)
Stage 1 7 12 13 16
Stage 2 7 16 12 12
Figure 5 Total response times for each stage.
Figure 6 Graphic and numerical representation of OAR, TDR
and ODR percentages. OAR, operational authentication rate;
ODR, operational detection rate; TDR, technical detection rate.
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medicines authentication at the point of checking than
their dispenser counterparts at the point of dispensing.
This difference could be due to the professional registra-
tion obligations of the operators in S1 and professional
good practice which protects the staff involved in S1 from
interruption during the medicines checking process, or
may have been due to a number of organisational behav-
iour, human and organisational factors associated with
the point of authentication, in the medicine supply
process. However, further investigation would be required
to support this argument further.
There were no concerns raised during this study regard-
ing the TDR (ﬁgure 6); this technology has been subse-
quently integrated and tested in a further two hospital
trust sites demonstrating the same 100% detection rate.
It was observed that even when the technology identi-
ﬁed a drug to be counterfeit, recalled or expired, the
staff across both stages did not always quarantine that
medicine. ODR rates (which represent the number of
medicines quarantined by the operator as a percentage
of those identiﬁed by the technology) demonstrated a
5.6% difference between stages; however, there was not a
statistical difference between the groups, and therefore
one group could not be described as ‘better’ than
another in this study for this parameter (Z-test) (95%
CI).24 Despite the lack of statistical signiﬁcance between
groups, there is a clinical and statistical signiﬁcant differ-
ence (Z-test) (95% CI)24 between the overall group in
terms of ODR compared with the expected legislative
detection rate of 100% (tables 1 and 2). Detection rates
appear to be inﬂuenced by two main factors, the compli-
ance of staff in the authentication of medicines (OAR)
and increased awareness to messaging which identiﬁes a
medicine as counterfeit, recalled or expired (ODR).
As a total group, there is a difference between the
ODR rates for the ‘Authenticated elsewhere’ subgroup
(58.3%) and those of other subgroups (expired, recalled
pack and recalled batch, average ODR 91%) (Z-test) (95
CI)24 (table 2). This is likely due to confusion between the
‘Authenticated elsewhere’ and ‘Already Authenticated
here’ messages which are similar in terms of message
content and colour (orange) (ﬁgure 7), with the former
requiring quarantine and the latter requiring no action.
This issue could be alleviated by changing the colour of
the ‘Authenticated elsewhere’ message to red which would
match other pop-ups requiring medicine quarantine.
The RR is the time taken to send information to an
external database, cross-check and retrieve a reply which
states the status of the drug was 152 ms (S1) and 165 ms
(S2) (ﬁgure 6) demonstrable in this study over 2791
scans, which is appropriate for systematic veriﬁcation
and or authentication of medicines when compared
with the accepted FMD regulatory limit of 300 ms.15 16
These data are, however, based on a relatively small
sample and may not necessarily be repeated in the pres-
ence of a larger throughput. This RR would require
regular assessment once this technology is implemented
nationally and internationally.
Table 2 Z-test outcomes for operational detection rate in each subgroup
Subgroup
Counterfeit (authenticated
elsewhere)
Pack
recalled Expired
Product
recalled
Counterfeit (authenticated elsewhere) Yes Yes Yes
Pack recalled Yes No No
Expired Yes No No
Product recalled Yes No No
Figure 7 Pop-up message warnings which are generated when a counterfeit medicine (left) and a medicine which has already
been authenticated on site (right) are scanned.
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Study positives and negatives
There was some participant group crossover in this
study; however, this is standard practice in UK NHS hos-
pital dispensaries, reﬂecting normal working patterns in
the medicine supply process. This study was carried out
in a single hospital and, therefore, similar studies in a
number of other UK hospital sites could adopt the
present study design and replicate the work to identify
whether the results of this study are indicative of the
entire NHS environment. Owing to the emerging nature
of this technology, there have been no other studies in
this ﬁeld to compare results. In addition, this study
included a large sample of study drugs which generated
results large enough to demonstrate statistically signiﬁ-
cant outcomes.
Context and impact
Government organisations such as the Federal Bureau of
Investigation (US), the Internal Revenue Service (US)
and the NHS (UK) are no strangers to information tech-
nology project failures.25 The NHS in the UK has experi-
enced a recent struggle with the national programme
for information technology (NPfIT), which required the
implementation of the electronic patient record by 2005
(a target set in 1998). By the spring of 2002, only 2% of
trusts had reached this target.26 27 The government then
ring-fenced the information technology budget and
pledged £2.3 billion to NPfIT with the aim of imple-
menting electronic patient records by 2007. An accom-
plishment which to this day is yet to be complete across
all NHS trusts. It is important to understand the role
that context plays in healthcare innovation. Each hos-
pital will have different contexts which will affect innova-
tive implementation and it is important to understand
internal and external contexts and how they facilitate or
negate the successful implementation of this healthcare
technology.25 28 It is important for policy and key deci-
sion makers to be cognisant of study results and past
projects and build on what is known when planning the
implementation of this detection tool; to put in place
effective strategies for education and training as well as
safeguards which may facilitate the authentication and,
therefore, detection of counterfeit, recalled and expired
medicines.
This study involved the presentation and the dissemin-
ation of an authentication protocol to the participants.
Carthy et al29 raise concerns regarding the growing
number of protocols and guidelines which require atten-
tion by NHS staff, which in this case may also have a
part to play in non-compliance, perhaps a more innova-
tive and interactive approach to education and training
would facilitate a higher compliance rate. Other ways to
improve compliance may include incentives. The FMD
allows nations to use a reimbursement code as part of
the 2D matrix which would result in payment by authen-
tication. This would increase the OAR and help to
reduce fraud within the NHS. It is therefore important
to be realistic about the introduction of technologies
into a heterogeneous environment20 and to involve staff
members in the implementation of projects to identify
areas for improvement before legal compliance.
Further research
Medicines authentication technology is an approach
which aims to safeguard European Union (EU) and US
citizens against the poor-quality medicines. It is im-
portant to identify the shortfalls of this technology and
make improvements before the EU (2019) and US
(2023) regulative deadlines. Further qualitative research
is required to understand expert opinion on medicines
authentication to identify contextual reasons for less
than optimum authentication rates and less than abso-
lute detection rates. It would also be important to under-
stand the technological, process and educational
adjustments required to improve the authentication and
detection rates demonstrated in this study which in turn
would improve patient safety. As research in this ﬁeld
moves closer to patient participation, it will be important
to include patients, carers and lay persons in the design
of future studies.
CONCLUSIONS
Medicines authentication technology is capable of
meeting the FMD-mandated response speed of <300 ms
and demonstrates a 100% TDR. The OAR requires
improvement which may be facilitated by innovative and
interactive education and training or through the intro-
duction of incentives such as ‘payment by authentica-
tion’. The operator detection rate was also <100% and
further qualitative research is required to identify tech-
nical solutions to facilitate the correct quarantine of
medicines identiﬁed as recalled, expired or potentially
counterfeit.
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